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Introduction
Dummett presents his interpretations of Frege’s “On Sense and Reference” (hereafter 
OSR) in chapter 5 of his Frege: Philosophy of Language. The chapter consists in a very detailed 
and clarifying explanation of many passages of OSR. However, some of the interpretations he 
presents about the notions involved in Frege’s Puzzle seem incorrect.
Frege’s article is already very problematic for not being clear enough when he introduces 
some notions (e.g. sense, tone, and ‘The True’). Dummett, in turn, proposes that Frege’s the-
ory of language involves yet another underlying notion, one that is not openly stated by him, 
namely, meaning. Three of the notions openly stated in OSR compose the latter according to 
Dummett, namely, sense, tone and force. It is not quite clear what he intended by doing this, 
because as an interpretation of OSR it seems clearly incorrect, as I hope to show in this paper, 
and it does not really help the reader to understand the puzzle in it. Nevertheless, the idea that 
meaning is composed by other semantic features seems basically correct and we can derive 
1 The writing of this paper was possible thanks to the funding of my master’s degree by the São Paulo 
Research Foundation – FAPESP (Process number 2014/06919-9). Also, I would like to thank Marco Ruffino, 





ON THE NOTION OF MEANING THAT DUMMETT ACCREDITS TO FREGE
support for this claim from the fact that it is used nowadays in many theories in the philosophy 
of language. Thus, the conclusion of this paper shall be that, although the general idea that 
Dummett is putting forward is a good one in itself, it is not good as an interpretation of Frege.
The strategy to reach this conclusion is (I) to explain what Frege’s puzzle is in order to 
elucidate what Frege’s aim was. (II) To present how the notion of meaning Dummett attributes 
to Frege is supposed to help one to better understand the puzzle and how it fails. Finally, (III) 
to present Dummett’s definition of meaning and show that the notion is incoherent (or at least 
needs a better explanation to work properly).
Frege’s Puzzle
At the beginning of OSR, although Frege deals with many topics, e.g. the use of emp-
ty terms, quotation, and the formation of judgments, he is mainly focused in answering four 
questions: (I) Is identity a relation? (II) Which entities are its relata? (In case the answer for (I) 
is affirmative) (III) In sentences about the same object, what explains the difference of cognitive 
value between two true sentences of the form a=a and a=b? (IV) Why the truth of sentences of 
the form a=a are knowable a priori while the truth-value of sentences of the form a=b someti-
mes cannot be established a priori?
The answer to (I) is affirmative. Thus, we should search for an answer to (II). However, in 
order to completely answer this question, we shall first consider the last two questions. (III) and 
(IV) are two sides of the same coin. Both are questions that concern the same problem, namely, 
Frege’s puzzle.
According to Frege, one knows that some sentence of the form a=a is true without the 
need of any reasoning or inquiry, for it is a logical truth and thus knowable a priori without the 
aid of any reasoning whatsoever. On the other hand, one cannot know at first glance the tru-
th-value of the sentence a=b. In sentences of the form a=b generally an empirical evidence is 
needed, meaning that the truth of it is not known immediately. Even when empirical evidence 
is unrequired, like in mathematical statements, some reasoning is needed for knowing its truth2. 
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Whenever sentences of these kinds deal with the same object, we are struck by puzzlement in a 
situation that can be put forward as follows: How is it possible for two sentences expressing the 
same relation, about the same object, to present such epistemic difference? Or, in other words, 
what explains the difference of information conveyed by sentences of the form a=b and a=a 
when a and b name the same objects?
In the sentences of the form a=b, were the terms a and b to be denotative, like Mill propo-
sed, it would not be possible for a difference in terms of cognitive value to exist (i.e. a difference 
in what is understood), because the mere comprehension of these sentences would already 
constitute knowledge that a and b  refer to the same object, and thus, one would immediately 
know the truth values of the sentences. From a communicative and epistemic point of view, 
language would be, then, flawless. As we can see from countless examples (Superman = Clark 
Kent, Hesperus = Phosphorus, etc.), this is not the case. To explain these epistemic and commu-
nicative flaws of language, Frege introduces the notion of sense. According to him, this notion 
would explain this difference in cognitive value. However, for some reason that is not altogether 
clear3, in Dummett’s eyes sense seems insufficient to explain the problem. He, then, introduces 
the notion of meaning.
Meaning and Cognitive Value
The notion of cognitive value is the center of the puzzle. What are we talking about when 
we talk about a difference in cognitive value? Dummett offers the following explanation:
[Frege’s] argument is set out in terms of the notion of ‘cognitive value’, that is, information 
content. (...) The notion of ‘information’ being appealed here does not require any elaborate 
explication: I acquire information when I learn something which I did not previously know, 
and Frege is asking how it is possible that I may be in a position to know the sense of an 
identity-statement, i.e. To understand it...4
more attention to the a priori versus a posteriori cases, we will keep the mathematical ones aside.
3 Dummett claims that he is not introducing the notion of meaning, rather the notion is underlying the 
whole idea Frege is proposing. (see DUMMETT (1973) pp. 83-4)





Thus, we can build the following chain of definitions:
Cognitive value = informational content (information)
Information = ‘what is learnt’
To learn = ‘come to know something previously unknown’
To know = to understand
Thus, for Dummett, cognitive value is ‘what is understood (that previously was not)’
However, this claim is highly questionable, since we obviously can say that one unders-
tands a false sentence, e.g. ‘Hesperus is Neptune’, nonetheless one would be very uncomfor-
table to claim that one knows that ‘Hesperus is Neptune’. To claim that one knows a falsehood 
(which is different from saying that one knows that something is a falsehood) would at best 
require a radically unorthodox understanding of knowledge. But we shall accept, for the sake of 
the argument, Dummett’s thesis and see where he goes with it.
He proceeds to introducing the aforementioned notion of meaning by claiming: “(...) me-
aning is that which a man knows when he understands a word”5. That is:
To know G = to understand G = to grasp the meaning of G6.
It is therefore possible to say, then, that for Dummett, when one grasps the meaning of 
an identity sentence G for the first time, one is learning its meaning. Therefore, one is acqui-
ring a certain piece of information, with a certain cognitive value. From this we can conclude 
that the difference between the cognitive value of a=a and a=b (which have the same object as 
referent of both terms) only exists when the referent and the senses of the component terms 
of the sentence are previously unknown, that is, when we do not have already grasped their 
meanings. For example, there is only difference between cognitive values when one does not 
know that ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ name the same object. When one learns this, ‘Hesperus 
5 Ibid. p. 95.
6 Dummett clearly states in page 92: “(...) a theory of meaning is a theory of understanding.”





is Phosphorus’ comes to have the same cognitive value as ‘Hesperus is Hesperus’, for nothing 
new is acquired.
A brief detour. Considering this view, it is also possible to conclude that the analyticity or 
syntheticity of a sentence like ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ is relative from subject to subject and is 
dependent on one’s degree of astronomical knowledge. For someone that did not know that the 
Morning Star is the Evening Star and comes to know this fact, the sentence would be synthetic, 
but for a trained astronomer it would be analytic. Nevertheless, this seems to be an extremely 
undesirable conclusion for philosophers predating the analytic/synthetic debates started in the 
middle of 20th century. (This conclusion is accepted and defended nowadays by G. Russell in 
(2008) and the ones that share many of her views like myself).
Dummett believes that, although the notion of meaning is not explicit in Frege’s writing, 
it is an intuitive notion that underlies his theory and is characterized by the union of three no-
tions that Frege deals with explicitly, namely, sense, force and tone. He says that
Frege drew, within the intuitive notion of meaning, a distinction between three ingredients: 
sense, tone and force. That is to say, he distinguished between these three things. He does 
not use any word to express the general notion of ‘meaning’, as I have here used the word, 
and therefore does not claim sense, tone and force as being ingredients in anything more 
general. (...) we may reasonably say that Frege discerns three ingredients within the intui-
tive notion of meaning...7
It is important to stress that in this notion of meaning that Dummet is drawing up the 
reference is not part of the meaning of an expression. If that was the case, it would be only 
possible to grasp the meaning of sentences whose referents one is acquainted with. Thus, one 
would not understand any sentence formed by empty terms or unknown objects8. Furthermore, 
neither the problem of ambiguity of communication nor Frege’s puzzle would arise.
For Dummett, then, we have the following scheme:
7 Ibid. pp. 83-4.
8 See Ibid. pp. 84 and 93.





‘what is known’ (knowledge) = ‘what is understood’ (meaning) = the sum of sense, force, 
and tone.
However, Frege explicitly says that “(...) thought alone does not yield any knowledge, but only 
when associated with its reference (...)”9. This points in the opposite direction of Dummett’s inter-
pretation, as we have just seen. This is, perhaps, the clearest textual evidence that Dummett’s 
interpretation is incompatible with what Frege is really proposing. I believe that this allows 
me to say that what Dummett is doing, indeed, is projecting onto Frege’s writing a new theory 
authored by him.
Another aspect of the notion of meaning that must be clarified is its compositionality. For 
Frege, the sense of a sentence like ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ is determined by the senses of its 
constituent terms ‘Hesperus’, ‘is’ and ‘Phosphorus’10. Thus, it is reasonable to claim that the me-
aning of a sentence follows the same procedure of formation and is dependent on the meaning 
of its constituent terms as well. If this is the case (and I will assume it is, because it is coherent to 
do so), the same must be valid for force and tone, since they are constituents of meaning. Thus, 
the force and tone of a sentence as a whole depend on the force and tone of its constituent ter-
ms. Bearing this in mind, we shall analyze these constituent notions.
A last observation that must be made about the notion of meaning is the fact that ‘Be-
deutung’, the German word often translated as ‘reference (referent)’ literally means ‘meaning’. I 
believe that this is evidence that Frege did not wish to introduce one more semantic notion, as 
Dummett believes; for if this was the case, it would be much wiser of him to preserve ‘Bedeutung’ 
to refer to meaning and ‘Referenz’ to refer to reference11. Dummett is aware of this terminological 
issue, but he does not think it is a problem12.
9 FREGE (2009) p. 140. My translation to English. Here, Frege uses thought (Gedanke) to express sense 
(see p. 137). However, it is acceptable to say that thought is a sum of sense, force and tone.
10 See. Ibid. pp. 137ss.; DUMMETT op. Cit. p. 104.
11 I must thank Professor Dirk Greimann for pointing this out.
12 See DUMMETT op. Cit. p. 84.






The notion of sense is probably the most important contribution of Frege to the philoso-
phy of language. He proposed it to explain the puzzle of cognitive value as we saw earlier. Ha-
ppily, it also explains many other phenomena, such as the use of empty names and the ability 
to speak about theoretical entities. At any rate, Frege’s main reason to draw this notion was to 
solve what we called Frege’s puzzle. For Frege, the cognitive difference between sentences of the 
form a=a and a=b that have the same object as referent can be explained simply by the idea that 
every sentence has a sense, which in turn has component expressions with senses of themsel-
ves. For Dummett, however, this solution relies on the notion of meaning and the difference 
between senses is just part of the solution13.
The notion of sense can be understood as the mode of presentation of a referent to a 
subject. In other words, a content of descriptive form that allows us to think about objects, that 
allows us to form thoughts about objects; or even as the description that allows one to identify, 
or capture, the referent of an expression in the world. Both interpretations are acceptable and 
widely acknowledged by commentators, though with much controversy. Since these problems 
are not relevant for this paper, I shall arbitrarily make use of the second definition as the stan-
dard one, for it seems to be the least controversial one.
Since there will not be a specific section to deal with reference in this paper, now seems to 
be a good moment to introduce what Frege believes referents are. For him, the objects themsel-
ves are the referents of names, for instance, ‘Hesperus’ has the planet Venus itself as its referent. 
On the other hand, sentences have the True and the False as their referents. Not the truth values 
of the sentences, but the True and the False (with capital letters) as entities themselves. The True 
is the referent of true sentences and the False of false sentences. That is, Frege claims that all 
true sentences have the same referent, the True, while all falsehoods refer to the False, even if 
they are about the most diverse objects. For most analytic philosophers of the 20th century, this 
is a controversial consequence of Frege’s theory. The reason is that most of these philosophers 
are empiricists who wish to avoid at all costs unpalatable theories that are committed to the 
13 As we shall see the other constituent notions of meaning do not play any role in the puzzle. Therefore, 
it is even stranger that Dummett demands the use of ‘meaning’ in opposition to the use of ‘sense’.





existence of such things as a third ‘realm’ of platonic objects which are neither mental, nor mate-
rial, which is precisely where the True and the False dwell14. But that is a topic for another time. 
The point here is not only to clarify what Frege thought about reference, but also to show that 
not all the semantic notions he used in his paper were compositional.
In the definition of sense adopted here, namely, the one in which sense is an entity of 
descriptive form that allows us to identify the referents of expressions in the real world, it is cle-
arly possible that the sense of an expression has something personal (but not private!) to each 
subject. Therefore, it is possible that the descriptions that form these thoughts vary from person 
to person. For example, it is plausible that a subject A understands ‘Amazon river’ as a synonym 
for ‘The longest river in the world’ and a subject B associates the name with the description 
‘The river that rises in the Andes and flows into the Atlantic ocean’; speaker A does not know 
where the river rises or where it ends and speaker B has no idea of which is the longest river in 
the world. Yet, these senses are perfectly communicable, and people can talk about the Amazon 
river understandably with little or no deviations in the content of their conversation. Therefore, 
senses are considered objective and shareable, in opposition to tone and to ideas (Vorstellungen), 
as we shall see15.
Another important aspect of sense is that it makes possible to use empty terms, which are 
terms that have no referents, in an intelligible manner. Thanks to this notion, we can unders-
tand and use successfully sentences like ‘Ulysses is an excellent commander’, thanks to the no-
tion of sense. Thus, I believe that we should make an addendum to our definition of sense: sense 
is a public thought (or part of a thought) expressed in a descriptive way that makes it possible 
for us to locate in the world the referents of the expression we utter, when they exist. In the case 
of empty terms, senses would allow us to locate them in scenarios where they exist.
14 Though this is a controversial point of Frege’s philosophy, it is a central one, for his axiom IV of his 
Basic Laws of Arithmetic depends on this, and consequently his whole theory for mathematics. Also, this 
could be a favorable point for a radical empiricist, for it permits Frege’s system to be extensional. (I am 
thankful to the anonymous referee for these points). 
15 This point is extremely well explained by Dummett. See pp. 96ss.






In Frege’s terminology, tone (or coloring, or even lighting), as opposed to sense, is the 
property of an expression that is related to ideas (Vorstellungen), which for him are incommuni-
cable.16 For Frege, for example, when two subjects are faced with the expression ‘stallion’, which 
has the same sense for both of them (say, the description ‘male equine’), it is nevertheless per-
fectly possible for them to form different “mental images” in relation to that expression. Subject 
A may imagine Marengo, Napoleon’s white horse, while subject B imagines Bucephalus, Ale-
xander’s black horse. Ideas are related to emotions, memories and other sensations that are not 
necessarily visual (e.g. the smell of horse excrement can be associated with the word by one of 
the subjects while not by the other)17.
It is also possible to understand tone as the component of meaning that, when subs-
tituted in a sentence, does not alter the truth-conditions of a proposition. For example, if we 
compare the sentences ‘Leonardo sweats like a pig’ and ‘Leonardo perspires like a pig’ we have 
the same sense for both sentences, the same force and the same reference, but we would have 
different tones, for both these sentences contain expressions with different tones. It is not very 
clear what Frege understood tone to be, but from what he writes and from what Dummett 
claims to be written in his work, one may understand tone as something similar to symbol, 
sign or name (when talking about individual words)18; this is, synonymous words seem to have 
different tones that nevertheless hold the same senses.
Force
Force, according to Dummett, should be understood as the property of meaning that 
distinguishes sentences that have the same sense and the same tone. For example, ‘the cat is 
white’, ‘is the cat white?’ and ‘cat, be white!’. All these sentences have the same tone and the 
16 Dummett disagrees with Frege about the impossibility of the communication of ideas. It seems that it 
is possible to communicate these contents through very complex descriptions, or perhaps through art (graphic 
and sound at least). Concerning this point Dummett’s objection seems correct to me. 
17 See ibid. pp. 84-5.
18 See MILLER p. 69.





same sense, for all their constituent terms have the same tone and the same sense; yet they 
mean different things, because the first has the force of an assertion, the second the force of a 
question and the third the force of an order.19
As we previously saw, sentential meanings are dependent on the meanings of its consti-
tuent terms, as sentential senses and sentential tones depend on the senses and tones of their 
sub-sentential expressions. Bearing this in mind, it is fair to ask: what force an expression like 
the name ‘Hesperus’ or the verb ‘to be’ has? Apparently, this question seems to be nonsense, for 
these expressions alone do not express a thought that can be asserted or questioned. It does not 
seem appropriate to say that the expressions ‘Hesperus’ or ‘Hesperus?’ have force in isolation, 
unless we understand them as ‘ƎxHx’ and ‘ƎxHx?’. However, this also does not seem appropriate, 
for we would no longer be talking about names, but about existential sentences instead.
It seems that force is a property existent only in sentences, or in whatever expresses a 
thought (Gedanke), in Frege’s terms. However, if this is correct, the principle of compositionality 
of meaning would be compromised, because the sentential force, which composes the senten-
tial meaning, does not depend on the forces of its component terms, since they do not exist.
One could propose an alternative by saying that isolated terms do not signify, that they do 
not have meanings. However, this seems simply wrong and incoherent with everything of we 
saw hitherto. For when I am faced with the word ‘Hesperus’ I understand something, and there 
is some information being received (even if an incomplete piece of information). One thing that 
could perhaps solve this impasse would be to present two classes of meaning: a saturated one, 
the complete meaning, found in terms within sentences and in the sentences themselves, and 
an unsaturated meaning, an incomplete one, found in free words, which convey some partial 
information that is not something concrete and univocal. However, to develop this train of 
thought is not the focus of this paper.
19 See Ibid. pp. 70-1.






With this paper I hope to have shown three things: (I) what exactly Frege’s puzzle is and 
how he attempted to solve it; that (II) Dummett’s notion of meaning is inconsistent with what 
Frege is proposing in OSR and (III) that this notion is also inconsistent with the component 
parts he ascribes to it, for the principle of compositionality is violated by the notion of force. I 
hope to have shown that Dummett’s notion of meaning is not plausible as an interpretation of 
Frege’s OSR.
Still, though the partition of the notion of meaning is flawed, it is, in principle, a good 
idea. And though the idea is not in Frege (since the notion is not in Frege, as we saw) it is an 
idea that should be pursued. I would like to register my wholehearted belief that the complex 
notion of meaning, in this sectioned way, introduced by Dummett is the correct and useful way 
to deal with problems in the philosophy of language. I believe that to solve many problems in 
related areas, this is the right path to follow; also, I believe that many philosophers nowadays, 
such as Stefano Predelli20 and Gillian Russell21, agree with my attitude, as we can see them using 
and developing different aspects of the notion of meaning.
20 PREDELLI, S. Meaning without Truth. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2013.
21 RUSSELL, G. Truth in Virtue of Meaning: a defence of the analytic/synthetic distinction. Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2008.
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RESUMO
Neste artigo, eu discuto a interpretação de “On sense and reference” de Frege feita por Dummett em seu Frege: 
Philosophy of Language, no qual ele atribui uma noção de significado a Frege que não está explícita no texto de 
“On sense and Reference”. Eu acredito que esta atribuição é incompatível com o que Frege realmente propõe no 
artigo e com a própria partição da noção de significado que Dummett propõe.
Palavras-chave  Dummett, Significado, Sentido, Tom, Força.
ABSTRACT
In this paper I will discuss Dummett’s interpretation of Frege’s “On sense and reference” offered in his Frege: Phi-
losophy of Language, where he attributes a notion of meaning to Frege that is not explicit in the text of “On sense 
and reference”. I believe this attribution is incompatible with what Frege is really saying in the article and with 
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